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OPTING ONLY IN:  CONTRACTARIANS, WAIVER OF
LIABILITY PROVISIONS, AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*
SANDEEP GOPALAN**
ABSTRACT
This paper will test the core claim of scholars in the nexus of
contracts tradition—that private ordering as a process of bargaining
creates optimal rules.  We do this by analyzing empirical evidence in the
context of waiver of liability provisions.  These provisions allow
companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of care
through amendments to the articles of incorporation.  With all states
allowing some form of these provisions, they represent a good laboratory
to examine the bargaining process between management and
shareholders.  The contractarian approach would suggest that
shareholders negotiate with management to obtain agreements that are in
their best interests.  If a process of bargaining is at work as they claim,
the opt-in process for waiver of liability provisions ought to generate a
variety of approaches.  Shareholders wanting a high degree of
accountability would presumably not support a waiver of liability.  In
other instances, shareholders might favor them in order to attract or retain
qualified managers.  Still others would presumably want a mix, allowing
waiver but only in specified circumstances.  
Our analysis reveals that the diversity predicted by a private ordering
model is not borne out by the evidence with waiver of liability provisions
for Fortune 100 companies.  All states permit such provisions and in the
Fortune 100, all but one company has them.  Moreover, they are
remarkably similar in effect, waiving liability to the fullest extent
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1. Professor Bebchuk prefers to label them “deregulators” writing that calling them
contractarians implies that their arguments are rooted in “the contractual view of the corporation.”
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1395, 1399 (1989) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom].  He points out that
“deregulators do not have a monopoly over the contractual view.”  Id.
2. The “nexus of contracts” concept apparently is first alluded to in Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (noting a “nexus of a set of contracting
relationships”).
3. The rise of this view is generally traced to the University of Chicago and the law and
economics movement.  See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern
Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 755 (2006) (“Disciples of the Chicago School of Law and
Economics controlled the agenda.  Their swift rise to dominance coincided with the ascendancy in
corporation law of a new hegemonic paradigm, founded on the view that the corporation is a nexus-
of-contracts—a consensual ordering of relations generally to be governed by private ordering and
not government regulation.”).  
4. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255-58 (1977).  In an influential recent article, Professor Mark
Roe refutes the state competition argument claiming that the possibility of federal intervention
clouds a pure “race.”  See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 602-03
(2003).
permitted by law.  In other words, one categorical rule was merely
replaced by another, dealing a significant blow to the contractarian thesis.
INTRODUCTION
The contractarian  strain of corporate law scholarship treats corporations as1
a nexus of contracts, allocating rights and obligations to the various
constituencies that make up the legal fiction that is the firm.   It eschews a “one2
size fits all” approach to regulation and instead favors the use of enabling
provisions that allow companies to opt in or opt out.  Unlike categorical rules
imposed by the state, market actors can engage in private ordering and bargain
for the most efficient arrangements.   Contractarians argue that the state possesses3
no advantages vis-à-vis market actors in crafting rules of the game.  To the extent
that the state prescribes mandatory rules, they are likely to come with significant
costs that could have been avoided had the parties been allowed to design their
own rules.  
Whatever the precise formulation of the view, contractarians, in the end,
place an almost talismanic faith in private ordering and on the market as the final
arbiter of efficiency.  While private ordering will not ineluctably lead to greater
efficiency, the market can be counted on to weed out the inefficient.  In contrast,
the inefficiencies arising from categorical rules are not susceptible to the same
correction mechanism.
As a corollary to this approach, contractarians characterize the evolution of
corporate law as a race to the top.   Under state law, categorical rules have4
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5. See Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom, supra note 1, at 1397 (“The primary
function of corporate law, they suggest, should be to facilitate the private contracting process by
providing a set of nonmandatory ‘standard-form’ provisions, with private parties free to adopt
charter provisions that opt out of any of these standard arrangements.”).  
6. This is not to say that an efficient result that applies equally to all companies and all kinds
of shareholders and managements should not be replicated in all companies.  But for this to happen,
it must be shown that the uniform result is the most efficient arrangement possible in all or most
situations.  If such a uniformly efficient arrangement cannot be crafted, variance is inevitable.
7. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom, supra note 1, at 1411-12.
8. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 835,
836 (2005).
gradually been replaced with enabling provisions, sometimes by transferring
authority from shareholders to the board of directors, and sometimes through
shareholder and board approval mechanisms.  The system, therefore, allows
companies to opt in or opt out of particular legal regimes, freeing managers to
negotiate and engage in the most efficient arrangements.  5
This Article examines an aspect of the contractarian approach to corporate
law.  The approach presupposes some ability of shareholders to “negotiate” with
management to obtain agreements that are in the collective best interests of both
groups.  Presumably, the mechanism for asserting these interests in many cases
is the ability to vote for or against a decision by management.  This might occur,
for example, where management can opt in or out of a regulatory regime through
an amendment to the articles of incorporation.  The need for shareholder approval
would cause some companies not to seek the opt-in or opt-out authority and for
others to limit the terms of the opt-in or opt-out regime in order to garner
sufficient support.  In other words, the regime would reflect “bargaining” between
shareholders and management with the goal of achieving the most efficient
relationship.  If indeed some bargaining transpires between the competing
interests, some degree of variance in practice would be expected.   6
While bargaining between competing interests is plausible in theory, in
reality the management domination of the approval process and the severe
problems of collective action confronted by shareholders make it all but
impossible.   As a result, the process of management submitting matters to7
shareholders cannot accurately be characterized as bargaining in any meaningful
sense of the term.  It is management that drafts the proposal, management that has
the authority to initiate the proposal, management that decides the most propitious
moment to put forth the proposal, and management that has the corporate treasury
at its disposal to ensure adoption of the proposal.  Moreover, once passed,
shareholders typically lack the authority to initiate repeal.   The consequences are8
stark:  once management obtains adoption, the provision remains in place,
irrespective of the wishes of shareholders, until management decides to initiate
a change.  
This Article examines whether the core claim of contractarians—that private
ordering as a process of bargaining creates optimal rules—is borne out by the
empirical evidence in the context of waiver of liability provisions.  These
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9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
10. Delaware originated the opt-in model, whereby companies could reduce liability by
affirmatively amending their articles of incorporation.  Indiana, some months earlier, adopted the
first opt-out model, whereby the statute eliminated monetary damages for grossly negligent
behavior by the board of directors but allowed companies to opt out of the regime in their articles
of incorporation.  See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory:  Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE  J. ON REG. 209, 221-22 (2006) [hereinafter Romano,
The States as a Laboratory]. 
11. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893, 898 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).
12. See Appendix, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088414 (follow
“download” hyperlink at top of page).
provisions allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty
of care through amendments to the articles of incorporation.   With all states9
allowing some form of these provisions, they represent a good laboratory to
examine the bargaining process between management and shareholders.   10
The choice of waiver of liability provisions for study is particularly
appropriate because they exemplify a contractarian approach to regulation.  They
were a reaction to purported problems created by a mandatory approach and
allowed companies to opt out of a regime that imposed liability on managers for
breach of the duty of care.   Moreover, as amendments to the articles, they11
require the assent of both managers and owners.  The outcome, therefore,
presumably results from negotiations between these two groups and ought to be
a good example of private ordering by contract.
If a process of bargaining is at work as the contractarians claim, then the opt-
in process for waiver of liability provisions ought to generate a variety of
approaches.  Shareholders wanting a high degree of accountability would
presumably not support a waiver of damages.  In other instances, shareholders
might favor them in order to attract or retain qualified managers.  Still other
shareholders would presumably want a mix, allowing waivers only in specified
circumstances.
In fact, as the analysis shows, none of the diversity predicted by a private
ordering model appears in connection with waiver of liability provisions.  They
are permitted by every state and are used by all but one Fortune 100 company.12
Moreover, they are remarkably similar in effect, waiving liability to the fullest
extent permitted by law.  In other words, one categorical rule was merely replaced
by another, with no evidence that a categorical waiver of liability was any more
efficient than a categorical rule imposing liability.  At the same time, the change
benefited management, suggesting that the motivation was not efficiency but self-
interest of one of the groups involved.  Moreover, whatever one might think
about the benefits of private ordering and bargaining, the evidence suggests that
it is not taking place in the waiver of liability context.  
This Article briefly reviews the position of contractarians in the debate on the
evolution of corporate law.  The Article then examines the impetus for waiver of
liability provisions which, contrary to claims, was not from the excesses of Smith
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13. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54
(Del. 2009).
14. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 409 (1989).  For a critical view, see Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1407-10
(1985).
15. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825 (1999).
16. Id. at 822.  Professor Eisenberg writes that
the nexus-of-contracts conception . . . neither can nor does mean what it literally says.
In ordinary language, the term contract means an agreement.  In law, the term means
a legally enforceable promise.  Pretty clearly, however, the nexus-of-contracts
conception does not mean either that the corporation is a nexus of agreements or that
it is a nexus of legally enforceable promises.
Id.
17. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1418 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract] (“The corporation
is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants to
select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that are
available in a large economy.  No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure
of corporate law.”).
18. Id. at 1419 (“Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors, but they
find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart.
It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.”).
v. Van Gorkom  but from a disguised attempt to pass along some of the costs of13
Directors and Officers’ (D&O) insurance to shareholders.  Thereafter the Article
analyzes the waiver provisions actually adopted by the Fortune 100 to determine
whether the variance predicted by the bargaining model has occurred.  Finally,
the piece ends with some observations and identifies some of the reforms
necessary to implement a private ordering model.
I.  A  BRIEF EXEGESIS ON THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS AND
THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
A widespread view in the academy is that corporations are best analyzed as
a “nexus of contracts.”   As Professor Eisenberg notes, “[u]nder the nexus-of-14
contracts conception, the body of shareholders is not conceived to own the
corporation.  Rather, shareholders are conceived to have only contractual claims
against the corporation.”   The corporation is created by a “nexus of reciprocal15
arrangements,”  and the role of the law should be to facilitate this contracting16
process.   Managers, owners, and others bargain for the most efficient17
relationships, which are ones that uniquely reflect the interests of the particular
parties involved.  
While recognizing that managers have self-interested motivations to pursue
their aims at the expense of the shareholders, contractarians rely on the “invisible
hand” to constrain such behavior.   Investors will punish self-interested behavior18
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19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See generally Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question:  The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 (1989); E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder
Franchise is Not a Myth:  A Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 825 (2007).
22. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 17, at 1444-45.  This begs
the question as to why parties could not come up with their own arrangements in the absence of any
demonstrably unique advantages that the state enjoyed in crafting such rules.  Default rules could
be crafted by private parties themselves.  All that is required for the elimination of repeat drafting
cost is that one party (or an industry group) publishes its draft, which can then be copied by all
other parties to the extent that they are efficient.  If corporate law’s function is only to supply
default rules, it would seem that it is of very little relevance.  This would hardly explain the
enormous expenditure of resources by state agencies in crafting them or of contractarians in
studying them.
23. Veasey, supra note 21, at 817 (noting “Delaware’s enabling statutory model, with a
unique overlay of expert judicial case law”).
24. See id.
25. This view was excoriated by William Cary over three decades ago, but it has been
perniciously hard to displace.  See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974) (“[A] pygmy among the 50 states prescribes,
interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an incentive to encourage
incorporation within its borders, thereby increasing its revenue.”).
26. See Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982); Ralph
Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
127, 129 (1982).
27. There tends to be an all or nothing approach in discussing this issue.  A race to the bottom
may explain some corporate law reforms but certainly not all.  See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L.
by discounting the securities issued by those companies, thus presenting an
effective incentive for managers to act in ways that maximize shareholder
welfare.   Over a period of time companies having poor governance19
arrangements will be weeded out by the market, and those exhibiting optimal
arrangements will thrive.   Contractarians, therefore, favor enabling provisions20
where parties can opt-in or opt-out and eschew the one-size-fits-all approach of
categorical rules.   Corporate law, in this framework, should merely provide a set21
of default rules.  22
The opposition to categorical rules has influenced the view of contractarians
on the evolution of corporate law.  The paradigmatic example is Delaware
—where companies choose to incorporate there because of its expert judiciary,23
sophisticated bar,  and a commitment to maintaining a climate for private24
ordering.   Contractarians view corporate law as a good that states are competing25
to supply and that companies choose because of the efficiency of the legal
regimes offered.  They characterize the predominance of companies incorporated
in Delaware as a race to the top  rather than to the bottom.   26 27
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REV. 317 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law]; Ralph K. Winter,
The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989).
28. Delaware benefits financially from its pro-management bias.  See Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1753-54 (2006).  Professor Hamermesh writes that “[r]evenue from the state corporate franchise
tax alone has in recent years constituted over twenty percent of the state’s budget, a fact of which
Delaware legislators are intensely aware.”  Id.
29. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1925-48 (1995); Roberta S.
Karmel, Is it Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 91-96 (1991).
30. One theory suggests that Delaware courts create indeterminacy in their case law as a
strategic choice to make it difficult for other states to copy, which explains why it is not possible
for other states to effectively compete with it.  See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory
of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-28 (1998); see also Douglas
M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law,
43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 112 (1990).
31. See the article by Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities
in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (noting that the contractarian
model is now the “dominant legal academic view”).  The best example may be the elimination of
the prohibition on discriminating among shareholders of the same class.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).  Delaware was the first state to permit companies,
in their charter, to waive liability for directors.  For the international perspective on this, see
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 20 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.
pdf (“All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally.”).  
32. Some have taken the position that the state law requirements are largely enabling, with
the remaining categorical rules “trivial.”  See generally Bernard S. Black, Legal Theory:  Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).  
33. Contractarians relied upon the market, specifically hostile takeovers, for corporate
control.  For a criticism of this reliance, see generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of
Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57 (1990).
34. Thus, even fiduciary duties should be subject to private ordering.  See Henry N. Butler
& Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:  A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65
With evidence mounting that Delaware’s legislature was captured by
management interests,  the race to the top theory has taken a beating.  The pro-28 29
management capture, has, for obvious reasons, maintained Delaware’s
preeminent position as the supplier of corporate law, despite copycat legislation
from other states.   With Delaware resolutely engaging in an almost continuous30
process of eliminating categorical rules,  the opportunities for private ordering31
have increased, and corporate law has inexorably moved away from the
mandatory approach.   32
For a time, contractarians comfortably took an uncompromising view on the
need for, and benefits from, enabling provisions.   Private ordering did not33
always have to result in a more efficient arrangement so long as the market stood
poised to weed out those that were inefficient.   The contractarian universe34
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WASH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties]
(stating that “the fundamentally contractual nature of fiduciary duties means that they should be
subject to the same presumption in favor of private ordering that applies to other contracts”).
35. See generally Brown, supra note 33.
36. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
112-14 (1965).
37. Of course, there is one substantial exception:  contractarians did not favor broad
managerial discretion in the area of antitakover tactics.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161, 1201-03 (1981). 
38. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to
Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1177-78 (1999) [hereinafter Bebchuk
& Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890-91 (2002)
[hereinafter Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force].
39. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 38, at 890-91.
40. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1781 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition].  Some scholars attempt to show that particular categories of issuers benefit
from incorporation in Delaware.  For example, they argue that IPOs of Delaware companies receive
increased valuation.  See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1559, 1571-72 (2002).  But if it were that clear that incorporating in Delaware improved
shares prices, all similarly situated companies would do so, and they do not.  See Bebchuk et al.,
Does the Evidence Favor State Competition, supra, at 1789 (“While Daines’s study makes an
impressive effort to control for as many parameters as possible, including type of business and firm
size, it nonetheless remains true that if in a group of seemingly identical firms, some firms
incorporate in Delaware and others do not, there must be omitted variables that produce this
differential behavior.  This is all the more true if it is supposed that one choice produces a
posited that those entering into inefficient arrangements would be penalized by
the market through lower share prices.   The market for corporate control,35 36
specifically hostile takeovers, would ensure that inefficient managers would be
eliminated.   Thus, irrespective of the number of inefficient arrangements, only37
the efficient would survive.
The view was always simplistic.  But in any event, the mechanism can no
longer be relied upon to police the efficiency of arrangements arising out of
private ordering.  Hostile tender offers have disappeared from the landscape.38
No longer able to show the ineluctable elimination of inefficient bargains,
contractarians were forced to argue that the enabling approach in Delaware
somehow resulted in greater aggregate efficiency.  That is, while conceding that
some managers and owners enter into inefficient arrangements, arrangements that
would not necessarily be eliminated by market forces, the enabling approach, in
the aggregate, produced more efficient behavior.39
There is little evidence to support this sweeping conclusion.  Some
contractarians have pointed to a handful of event studies purporting to show that
share prices increased upon reincorporation in Delaware.   This ostensibly40
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substantial increase in firm value and the other does not.”).  
41. William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 327-29 (1997).
42. See Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition, supra note 40, at 1791-
92 (“These six studies . . . present a rather mixed picture.  Roberta Romano’s study, the earliest and
most influential of the six, found a positive abnormal return of 4.18%.  However, three of the
subsequent five studies found abnormal returns in the vicinity of 1%, and two of the subsequent
five studies, including the most recent event study which used the largest sample size, did not find
an abnormal return that differed from zero in a statistically significant way.”) (footnotes omitted).
43. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2384 n.76 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors].
44. Id.  Similarly, during the takeover era, the tendency was to note the short term value of
acquisitions to the bidder (generally neutral) without attempting to assess the longer term impact.
See Brown, supra note 33, at 87. 
45. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (stating that “the rules that Delaware
supplies often can be viewed as attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly
to an elite cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state”).
46. Not all corporate law reforms are explainable as a product of the race to the bottom.  See
generally Brown, The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law, supra note 27.  One reform that is
explainable, however, is the widespread adoption of waiver of liability provisions.  These
provisions benefit management by including in the articles, a provision that eliminates monetary
damages for breach of the duty of care.  Nonetheless, in the last twenty years, a remarkably short
period of time for legal reform, all fifty states put some type of reduced liability provision in place.
While a possible example of “private ordering,” these provisions have become ubiquitous,
suggesting that they are not in fact a result of individual negotiation.  Moreover, even if a waiver
were necessary to attract the most efficient management in a particular case, the provision applied
to all subsequent managers.  Thus, these provisions essentially result in shareholders indefinitely
ceding away damages for mismanagement irrespective of the particular management involved.
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003,15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2006).  The Act preempts a
number of state law provisions and imposes a series of mandatory requirements.  
48. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack
represented the market’s judgment that Delaware’s law was more efficient than
the alternatives.   The studies, however, do not make a strong case.  The results41
are inconsistent  and focus on short term results.   They do not offer a view on42 43
the long term impact.   They also conflict with the facts on the ground.  To the44
extent re-incorporation results in a predictable increase in share prices, the
impetus for engaging in the transaction ought to come from financial experts.  In
fact, the literature indicates that re-incorporations were promoted by lawyers, not
investment bankers.   Finally, corporate law reform often has managerial self-45
interest at its core rather, than efficiency.46
The debate over enabling versus categorical rules surfaced with a vengeance
in the commentary surrounding the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(the Act) providing a judgment of sorts on the approach.   The Act summarily47
rejected the contractarian approach, adopting a host of categorical rules.   The48
294 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:285
Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (2006).  
49. See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
50. These criticisms are discussed and largely dismissed.  Brown, supra note 48, at 309.
51. See Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.
stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (reporting a ten-year low in the number of securities fraud
suits brought in 2006).  The number of suits increased in 2007 but still represented the third lowest
total since the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995.  Id.  
52. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 492 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, Optimal Defaults]
(“To be sure, a charter amendment requires a vote of shareholder approval.  Such votes, however,
take place only on amendments initiated by management.  Management thus has an effective veto
power over charter amendments.  As a result, for any level of shareholder support, corporations are
much more likely to adopt amendments management favors than amendments management
disfavors.”).  
53. This may be a result of what Professor Bebchuk calls “network externalities.”  Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 890 (2005).
It is advantageous for a company to offer an arrangement that is familiar to institutional
investors, that facilitates pricing relative to other companies, that is backed by a
developed body of precedents and judges familiar with the arrangement.  Conversely,
companies are discouraged from adopting arrangements that are unconventional and
radically different from those in other companies.
Id.
54. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
55. See id.
response was a fusillade of criticism and invective, with at least one scholar
labeling the Act “quack corporate governance,”  a judgment offered hardly49
before the ink was dry.   Yet as the stock market hit record highs and the number50
of fraud actions fell, the evidence suggested that the categorical approach in fact
improved the integrity of the capital markets.  51
But the contractarian approach had an even greater fundamental problem in
that it simply assumed the conditions necessary for private ordering.  Proponents
had little to say about the disparate bargaining positions of managers and owners,
the problems of collective action and, most critically, the management’s
monopoly to initiate the process of, or changes to, the opt–in or opt-out process.52
In other words, the opt-in or opt-out provisions did not allow private ordering.53
II.  PRIVATE ORDERING AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS
A.  Overview
Delaware became the first state to adopt an “opt-in” approach to waivers of
liability in 1986.   The provision allowed companies to insert into their articles54
of incorporation provisions that waived monetary damages for breaches of the
duty of care.   These provisions had to be approved by both directors and55
shareholders, presumably giving rise to a bargaining process.  
2009] OPTING ONLY IN 295
56. Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency
and Dissolution: Defining Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 n.16 (1995)
(“Accordingly, contractarians support enforcement of corporate provisions which eliminate or
restrict managerial duties and liabilities.”); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1781-82 (2001). 
57. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 767, 776 (1989) [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause] (“Corporate
terms are, in fact, efficiently priced in these markets.  It follows that improving the terms of a
corporate contract—by adding or deleting fiduciary duties where appropriate—will positively affect
the price of the corporation’s securities.  This gives a control purchaser the opportunity to profit by
changing the terms of the contract.”).  
58. As Roberta Romano has said:
State law is an enabling approach.  It is a set of default rules.  Sometimes firms opt out
of them and sometimes they opt in, and I think that reflects the essential variation in
firms about what they think is the best governance structure, the best Board of Directors
for each firm, so we tailor it.
Transcript of Roundtable Discussions Regarding the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation
Law at 26, Securities and Exchange Commission (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
proxyprocess/proxy-transcript050707.pdf; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as
Residual Claims:  Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm
Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1272 (1999) (“Stated another way, from a nexus-of-
contracts perspective, because firms consist of a complex web of contractual relationships, firm
behavior depends critically on what those contracts provide.  In turn, the contract provisions
themselves depend on the outcome of the bargaining process that takes place between the
contracting parties.”).  
59. The numbers here are too great to cite thoroughly.  Suffice it to say that it is the view of
Stephen Bainbridge at UCLA.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A
Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 856, 891 n.177 (1997) (book review) (“As such, a one-size-fits-all state-sanctioned code of
behavior cannot fit everyone and may not fit anyone.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate
Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees:  Participatory Management and Natural Law,
43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 775 (1998) (“As a result, legislative action is likely to take on a one-size-fits-
all approach, which in turn is unlikely to fit anyone.”); see also Henry N. Butler, Smith v. Van
Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of Random Mutations in the Evolution of
The provisions replaced a categorical rule with an enabling provision, the
very sort of arrangements contractarians favor.   Enabling provisions permitted56
private ordering, facilitating greater efficiency.   By requiring shareholder and57
management approval, the contractarian thesis would predict a multitude of
variations in waiver of liability provisions, each designed to promote efficiency.58
As the data shows, these “benefits” have not materialized.  There has been no
evidence of bargaining and no evidence of true private ordering.  Instead, one
categorical rule has merely replaced another.  In other words, the empirical
evidence shows implementation of a “one-size-fits-all” approach, the very thing
that contractarians vehemently oppose.   The only difference is that the new59
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Corporate Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 277 (2006); Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties, supra note 34, at 46; Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 43, at 2427-28.
60. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 833.
61. See, e.g., Dell Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, http://public.thecorporatelibrary.
net/charters/cha_ 13349.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
62. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (De.
2009).
categorical rule favors managers over shareholders.
Further, it is arguable that the waiver of liability provision is not in the nature
of a default rule at all.  As Professor Eisenberg notes, “[t]he standard
methodology for establishing the content of a default rule is that the rule should
have the content that the affected parties would have agreed upon if they had
costlessly negotiated on the matter.”   If this is indeed the test of a default rule,60
it would be strange to suppose that shareholders would negotiate with
management to absolve directors of liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties.
If the rule was that directors were personally liable for breaches of the duty of
care, but the more efficient rule was that they should not be personally liable, the
parties would contract around the rule to reach a more efficient outcome.
Bargaining around the rule can only occur when transaction costs are low.  If the
transaction costs are high, then the parties would be forced to live with the
inefficient categorical rule imposing personal liability.  In such scenarios, a
default rule absolving directors of personal liability would make sense.
Would such a rule be more efficient?  Shareholders would sue directors
individually or jointly, and shareholders could elect to sue those with the deepest
pockets.  These directors would have to sue the others for contribution.  In this
circumstance, individuals with significant personal resources would decline
directorships so the board would be comprised of individuals with little or
nothing at stake, possibly even by individuals who are in serious debt.  Personal
liability is of little avail because a successful shareholder would collect nothing.
Furthermore, if personal liability were the rule, even good candidates who are
mired in debt might shirk directorships, which would uninjure shareholders by
forcing them to accept less than ideal candidates as directors.
Waiver of liability is clearly not the only option.  It is entirely possible to
externalize some of these risks—whether it is by insurance, limitations of
liability, or selective waivers.  If true bargaining was at work, one would expect
to see a range of these outcomes, with the most efficient being replicated.  What
we have, instead, is waiver of liability to the fullest extent allowed by the law.61
This leads to the conclusion that the provisions are pro-management categorical
rules, rather than efficient default rules that the parties themselves might have
designed had they been negotiating with low contracting costs.  It is curious that
contractarians have no problem with categorical rules when they are pro-
management.
There is not any evidence that the new categorical rule results in greater
efficiency.  The provision was adopted not because of the reasoning in Smith v.
Van Gorkom,  at least not overtly.  Instead, the perceived “crisis” in D&O62
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63. Even Romano acknowledges that by “late 1987, the D & O insurance market was no
longer in turmoil.”  Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1156 (1990) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate Governance].  
64. Some have questioned whether “crisis” is an appropriate term, at least with respect to the
allegations that the shifts in the insurance market affected the pool of qualified candidates willing
to serve on the board.  See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 478-79
(2007).   
65. See Dennis J. Block et al., Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG.
L.J. 130, 130-31 (1986) (“The market for directors and officers . . . liability insurance is currently
is in a state of crisis.  Premiums are skyrocketing, deductibles are increasing at an extraordinary
rate, coverage is shrinking, and more and more insurance companies are terminating their D&O
programs.  At the same time, policy durations are becoming shorter, and the policies themselves
have an increasing number of exclusions.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Michael D. Sousa, Making
Sense of the Bramble-Filled Thicket:  The “Insured vs. Insured” Exclusion in the Bankruptcy
Context, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 375 (2007) (“For example, 50% of the corporate
respondents to a survey released in 1987 and conducted by the actuarial and insurance consulting
firm the Wyatt Company reported that their directors and officers liability insurance premiums had
been recently increased by 300% or more; 27% of the respondents reported deductibles increased
by 300% or more; and 27% of the respondents reported that their maximum coverage had been
reduced by 50% or more.”).  
66. In hindsight, it is clear that the insurance market goes through periodic boom and bust
cycles, and a bust cycle occurred during this time period.  See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith,
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:  Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability
Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007) (“The D&O insurance market went through
this ‘hard’ phase in the mid-1980s and again in 2001-2003.  More recently, the D&O insurance
market has been shifting to the ‘soft’ phase.”) (footnotes omitted).  These boom and bust cycles are
“correlated” with other business cycles.  Id. at 506.  
insurance, something that was well in process long before the court opted to
enforce the duty of care, induced the change.  In other words, the ostensible
reason for waiver of liability provisions was to intervene in the market for D&O
insurance, presumably to lower the costs.  There was no evidence that the
approach taken by the Delaware legislature was necessary, would have any
significant impact on the market for D&O insurance, or was likely to result in
greater efficiency than allowing for the inevitable market correction.  In fact,
almost as the ink dried on the legislation, the D&O “crisis” ended.   At the same63
time, while having little or no impact on D&O insurance, the provisions benefited
managers by reducing their exposure to liability.
B.  Waiver of Liability:  An Exegesis
D&O insurance had, by the 1980s, become a fixture in the corporate board
room.  As the decade opened, however, a “crisis” occurred.   In renewing their64
policies, companies often found that the costs had risen sharply, the exclusions
had increased, and the amount of coverage was reduced.   There were various65
reasons for the crisis, including traditional cycles that affected all types of
commercial insurance.66
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67. Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589,
590 (2006).  
68. Delaware courts are still unwilling to find violations of the duty of care.  In the period
1980 until 2004, research uncovered only five derivative and twelve direct actions against outside
directors that went to trial.  Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1064-66 (2006).  
69. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54
(Del. 2009).
70. Id. at 889.  The directors of Trans Union appeared beholden and under the influence of
Van Gorkom, who wanted the merger approved so that he could sell his interest before retiring.
See id. at 865-66, 869.  The case was not brought under the duty of loyalty because Van Gorkom
got a benefit shared by the other stockholders, a Delaware crafted exception.  Id. at 872-73.  As two
commentators noted before the case was decided, “courts have proven remarkably reluctant to
impose liability where no element of self-dealing or personal benefit was present.”  John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 317 (1981).
71. See Stephen A. Radin, The Director’s Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 719 (1988) (“The court accordingly remanded the case for a
determination of the fair value of the Trans Union shares at the time of the board’s decision, and
for an award of damages to the extent that the fair value exceeded $55 per share.  The case was
settled prior to such a determination for $23.5 million, amounting to approximately $1.87 per share.
The settlement was conditioned upon a $10 million payment by either Trans Union’s or the
individual directors’ insurance carrier; most of the remaining $13.5 million was contributed by the
Pritzker company that had acquired Trans Union.”) (footnotes omitted).  
72. Id.; see also Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
after Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 n.a1 (1985) (editor’s note) (“[A]n agreement was reached
to settle the Van Gorkom litigation by the payment of $23.5 million to the plaintiff class.  Of that
amount, a reported $10 million, the policy limit, is to be provided by Trans Union’s directors and
officers liability insurance carrier.  Although the group which acquired Trans Union in the disputed
acquisition was not a defendant, according to a newspaper account nearly all of the $13.5 million
balance will be paid by the acquiring group on behalf of the Trans Union defendant directors.”);
One development that did not explain the “crisis,” however, was the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom.  For much of this century,
the duty of care in Delaware led, what one commentator labeled, a “humble
existence.”   However, “comatose” was perhaps a more apt description.67
Delaware courts simply did not find violations of the duty of care.  Directors
confronted little or no risk of liability for ordinary business decisions.  Only suits
alleging conflicts of interest had any realistic hope of success.   68
This placid state of affairs was disrupted by the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.   The court found the business judgment rule69
inapplicable to an “uninformed” board.   The directors found themselves in the70
unusual position of having to show the fairness of the transaction in which they
received no personal benefit.  The case ultimately settled for more than $23
million,  an amount paid not by the directors but by Jay Pritzker, the acquirer,71
and the D&O insurance policy.72
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see also Black et al., supra note 68, at 1067 (“The settlement was for $23.5 million, which
exceeded Trans Union’s $10 million in D&O coverage.  The public story is that the acquirer,
controlled by the Pritzker family, voluntarily paid the damage award against the directors, and the
Pritzkers asked only that each director make a charitable contribution equal to ten percent of the
damages exceeding the D&O coverage ($135,000 per person).”).  
73. See Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 231 (2006)
(“The court’s decision shook the foundations of the corporate world.”); Fred S. McChesney, A Bird
in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
631, 631 (2002) (“Considered a legal disaster in 1985, it is judged no less disastrous today.”)
(footnote omitted).  
74. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 71, at 707-08.  
75. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW. 1437, 1445 (1985) [hereinafter Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule]; Manning, supra note
72, at 1.
76. The “evidence” was almost entirely anecdotal.  See Faye A. Silas, Risky Business:
Corporate Directors Bail Out, 72 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (June 1986).  A study during the period by
Korn/Ferry reported that twenty percent of “companies reported that qualified candidates had
refused an invitation to serve as directors in 1985.”  Id.  Thus, for example, two prominent lawyers
in Delaware justified the state’s waiver of liability provision in part because of the difficulty
companies were having attracting qualified candidates to the board.  See R. Franklin Balotti &
Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 18 (1987).  Their support?  Id. at 9 n.18 (citing Laurie Baum & John A. Byrne,
The Job Nobody Wants, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; Business Struggles to Adopt as Insurance
Crises Spreads, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31; WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1986, at 32.).
77. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 75, at 1455 (labeling decision as “one
of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law”).  
78. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893, 898 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).
79. Id. at 874 (“The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom’s
role in forcing the ‘sale’ of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price. . . .”).
The sale to Pritzker was engineered by Van Gorkom, the CEO of Transunion.  Id. at 866-67.
Stepping down as CEO and chairman, Van Gorkom wanted to sell the company as a way of cashing
The decision drew an outcry from corporate America  and fueled loud73
criticism.   Some complained that the case applied a negligence rather than gross74
negligence standard, a characterization hard to justify on the facts.   Others saw75
dire consequences, asserting that qualified persons would be unwilling to serve
as directors of public companies.   Law and economics scholars denounced the76
categorical nature of the decision.  77
In fact, the criticisms were overwrought.  There was little chance that Van
Gorkom would presage a broad reexamination of, or change in, the duties of
directors.  For one thing, the case was decided by a 3-2 margin,  a departure from78
the usual display of unanimity in fiduciary duty cases.  For another, the case
involved a pseudo-loyalty claim, which perhaps explained the heightened
scrutiny.   Third, the threatened uncertainty was exaggerated.   The case made79 80
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out his large ownership interest.  Id. at 865-66.  Because, however, he was to receive a benefit in
the sale that was shared by all stockholders, the Delaware courts categorically excluded
consideration under the duty of loyalty.  See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del.
1971).
80. Instead, the decision merely required that the file contain sufficient paper to support the
decision, often in the form of a fairness opinion.  See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Mergers:  Fair Should
Be Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 36. 
81. The court repeated that shareholders had the burden of overturning the presumption of
the business judgment rule and that the applicable standard was gross negligence.  See Dennis R.
Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom:  Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to
Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 322 (2006) (“In short,
despite the hysteria of the moment, directors were no more at risk after Van Gorkom than they ever
were before.”); see also Morton Moskin, Trans Union:  A Nailed Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405,
406 (1985) (“The Trans Union court did not depart from the established rules.”).  
82. See Mark J. Lowenstein, A. Fleischer, Jr., G. Hazard, Jr., and M. Klipper, Board Games,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 135, 138 (1990) (book review) (“The lasting practical effect of Smith may be,
at best, that directors more carefully document the reasons that they proceeded as they did.
Corporate counsel are likely to integrate the teachings of Smith in their standard advice for
corporate board meetings to remove any doubt that the board action was properly approved.  One
cannot conclude from Smith that directors will exercise greater control over senior management or
more independence from it.  The real question following Smith is whether the courts will cut
through this formalism when director action is challenged and the board can demonstrate the due
deliberation called for by Smith.”) (footnote omitted).
83. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform,
29 J. CORP. L. 625, 647 (2004) (“Although Van Gorkom raises the specter of potentially limitless
personal liability for directors, the decision was an aberration in Delaware jurisprudence and has
been almost uniformly criticized.  No subsequent Delaware decision has premised director liability
on a breach of the duty of care.”) (footnotes omitted).  
84. See Rachel A. Fink, Social Ties in the Boardroom:  Changing the Definition of Director
Independence to Eliminate “Rubber-Stamping” Boards, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 487 (2006)
(“Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court weakened the stringent Unocal and Revlon duties through
subsequent decisions, just as it had done after the first wave of proshareholder decisions.”)
(footnote omitted).  
85. See Honabach, supra note 81, at 324 (“The causes for the increased rates were multifold,
but it became a popular, yet misguided, sport to point to the Van Gorkom decision as a major
contributing cause.”).  Thus, Romano notes that:  “Many factors contributed to the market’s
turbulence, including the expansion of directors’ liability.  The most important case in this regard
no new law,  did not second guess the board, and relied on a relatively objective81
element of the business judgment rule.   82
Most importantly, the decision arose in Delaware.   There was no reason to83
believe that a decision perceived as anti-management would somehow become
a mainstay of the corporate governance process.  Indeed, Delaware courts quickly
isolated the decision and limited its impact.84
Van Gorkom created consternation in the boardroom but did not significantly
contribute to the D&O insurance crisis, which was already well underway.85
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was a 1985 Delaware decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom.”  Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra
note 10, at 220 (footnote omitted).  Given the reasons noted above, see supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text, and the fact that Van Gorkom was decided in 1985, only a year before the
“crisis” ended, it is inaccurate to suggest that this decision played a significant role in the “crisis.”
Romano herself is forced to concede that “Van Gorkom was decided after the D & O crisis is
thought to have begun, so it is best considered a contributing, rather than causal, factor for the
market disruption.”  Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 10, at 221 n.25.  
86. See William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 898
(1997) (“[C]ertainty . . . also creates the risk that agents—such as corporate management—might
deploy such well-defined rules cleverly (and technically correctly), but with the purpose in mind
not to advance long-term interests of investors, but to pursue some different purpose . . . . Thus, at
least in that corner of contract law occupied by corporation law, clarity itself may be thought to be
a qualified good, not an unqualified good.”).  
87. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1988)  (“The first state to respond to
the developments of the mid-1980s was Indiana, in April 1986, followed by Delaware in June.”).
88. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 76, at 9 n.21 (“Among the proposals considered and
rejected were amending § 145(b) to permit indemnification of judgments or amounts paid in
settlement of derivative suits, amending § 145(g) to permit wholly-owned ‘captive’ subsidiaries to
provide ‘insurance’ to the parent corporation, providing a statutory ‘cap’ for personal liability of
directors, and providing an automatic statutory exemption from certain types of liability.”).  Other
models were adopted in the early years.  Roberta Romano has a thorough discussion of the
development of these provisions.  See Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 10, at 220-
23.
89. Support for the approach could only be found in a turn of the century case in England,
upholding a charter provision waiving liability.  See E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports
Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS.
LAW. 399, 403 (1987) (“The concept of a provision in the certificate of incorporation limiting or
eliminating the liability of directors was not without precedent.  Some scholars had suggested that
the certificate of incorporation of Delaware corporations could be amended to limit or eliminate
liability of directors without enabling legislation under existing law by analogy to trust law in an
old English Chancery decision that appeared to sanction a corporate charter provision limiting
Indeed, an argument could be made that, if anything, the case encouraged greater
diligence by directors in the boardroom and should have reduced liability and the
cost of coverage.   Nonetheless, it was no coincidence that waiver of liability86
provisions followed quickly in the aftermath of the decision.
C.  Section 102(b)(7)
The consternation caused by Van Gorkom threatened Delaware’s pro-
management position.  Not lost on the Delaware bar and legislature, the Council
of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association set to work
on a legislative response.  That Indiana passed a statute designed to reduce
liability no doubt increased the pressure on Delaware to act.   Rejecting a87
number of other approaches,  the Council ultimately settled on what was to88
become Section 102(b)(7).   Relying on an “opt-in” approach, the provision89
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liability.”).  The Chancery case mentioned is In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Ltd.,
(1911) 1 Ch. 425.
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).  The provision allowed
companies to “eliminate or limit personal liability of . . . directors . . . for violations of a director’s
fiduciary duty of care.” Commentary on Section 102(b)(7), S. 533, 133d Gen. Assembly 2, 65 Del.
Laws ch. 289 (1986).
91. Veasey et al., supra note 89, at 402 (“In essence, the new legislation permits a
corporation, by a provision in its certificate of incorporation, to protect its directors from monetary
liability for duty of care violations, i.e., liability for gross negligence.”).
92. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 76, at 9 (quoting the synopsis accompanying Senate Bill
No. 533, proposing the legislative amendments); see also Leo Herzel, Relief For Directors, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 17, 1986, § 1, at 11 (“The immediate cause for the enactment of the new
Delaware statute is a sharp change, adverse to directors, in the market for director and officer (D
and O) liability insurance.”).
93. Herbert S. Wander & Alain G. LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control
Transactions and Today’s Business Judgement Rule, 42 BUS. LAW. 29, 40 n.57 (“The Delaware
legislature has responded to the increased judicial scrutiny of the boardroom (particularly the Van
Gorkom decision) and to the dramatic reductions in available directors’ and officers’ liability
insurance.”); see also Duggin & Goldman, supra note 73, at 231-32 (“The legislative history of the
authorized companies to insert into their articles a provision that essentially
allowed for the waiver of monetary damages against the board for violations of
the duty of care.   In other words, companies could absolve their directors for90
grossly negligent behavior.91
Despite the temporal proximity to Van Gorkom, the legislative history of the
provision indicated that the impetus was the “crisis” in the D&O insurance
market:
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a
legislative response to recent changes in the market for directors’ liability
insurance. Such insurance has become a relatively standard condition of
employment for directors. Recent changes in that market, including the
unavailability of the traditional policies (and, in many cases, the
unavailability of any type of policy from the traditional insurance
carriers) have threatened the quality and stability of the governance of
Delaware corporations because directors have become unwilling, in
many instances, to serve without the protection which such insurance
provides and, in other instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of
insurance from making entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are
intended to allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection,
in various forms, to their directors and to limit director liability under
certain circumstances.92
Aware that the “crisis” was economic in nature (reflecting increased costs of
insurance), the legislature attempted to link the reform to improved governance.
Waiver of liability provisions would ensure a steady supply of qualified
directors.93
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statute is sparse, but it is clear that the legislature’s objective was to undo a decision that many
believed would discourage qualified people from serving as corporate directors.”); James L.
Griffith, Jr., Director Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards and Legislative Controls
on Liability, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 653, 688 (1995) (“Most commentators attribute enactment of
section 102(b)(7) to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.  There is no
direct evidence in the legislative history to support such a contention.  Rather, the General
Assembly seemed concerned that director and officer insurance was becoming unavailable and, as
a result, the best directors would not serve on the boards of Delaware corporations.”) (footnotes
omitted).
94. David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law:
A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 497 (2004) (“Delaware did not become the
center of American corporate law by ignoring the needs and worries of corporate directors.”).  
95. The number of law suits against directors apparently doubled between 1974 and 1984.
Romano, Corporate Governance, supra note 63, at 1158; see also Griffith, supra note 93, at 688
n.210 (“First, the market was probably already in the early stages of an unavailability crisis, as
government regulation was on the rise, and government and private lawsuits were around every
corner.”).  
96. Premiums began to escalate even before the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van
Gorkom.  See Griffith, supra note 93, at 688 n.210.  Yet oddly, Romano notes that the D&O
insurance market had “changed dramatically” by 1984, with “premiums skyrocketing at the same
time that coverage was shrinking and deductible increasing.”  Romano, The States as a Laboratory,
supra note 10, at 220.  She notes that “many factors” contributed to this increase, “including the
expansion of directors’ liability” and describes Van Gorkom as “[t]he most important case in this
regard.”  See id.  However, Van Gorkom was decided in 1985, after the dramatic change, and even
Romano acknowledges that the crisis had largely passed by 1986, shortly after the decision was
rendered.  See id. at 221 n.25 (“It should be noted that Van Gorkom was decided after the D&O
crisis is thought to have begun, so it is best considered a contributing, rather than causal, factor for
the market disruption.”).
97. During the period, for example, the costs of insurance increased for other types of
liability, which suggests that the problem was industry-wide.  Romano, Corporate Governance,
supra note 63, at 1161 (“D & O insurers did not respond to the enactment of limited liability
statutes by lowering premiums, although the vast majority of corporations that had the opportunity
to opt for these new regimes did so.”); see also Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’
and Officers’ Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 31-32 (1989) [hereinafter Romano, What
Went Wrong] (“Insurers did not respond to the enactment of these statutes by reducing 1987 policy
rates, although many firms acted immediately to amend their charters.”).  Romano, who clearly
favored the provisions, came up with two possible explanations.  “First, the statutes in most states
do not exempt from liability claims for breach of the duty of loyalty, violation of federal securities
laws, and breach of the duty of care by directors who are also officers.”  Romano, Corporate
Governance, supra note 63, at 1161.  In other words, Van Gorkom and the duty of care had little
The rationale was suspect, solving a problem in the D&O insurance market
that either did not exist or could have been more appropriately corrected by the
market.   First, it presupposed that the insurance “crisis” resulted from an94
increased risk of liability  under the duty of care, an unproven assumption at the95
time  that ultimately proved incorrect.   Second, there was every reason to96 97
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impact on the D&O policies.  “Second, and perhaps more important, the statutes’ effectiveness will
depend on how courts interpret them.”  Id.  
98. As insurance companies proved better able to assess the risks associated with D&O
insurance, premiums would presumably stabilize and additional carriers would enter the market.
This is apparently what occurred.  See Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 10, at 221
n.25.
99. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 66, at 507 (“The tightening of underwriting standards
accompanies a ‘hard market’ in which premiums and, after a lag, underwriting profits, rise.
Increased underwriting profits, of course, spur competition, whether from new entrants or
established companies seeking to increase market share, and competition leads to another ‘soft
market’ of loosening of underwriting standards and declining profits. The process is described as
cyclical because each market condition contains the seed to generate the other.”) (footnote omitted).
100. See Romano, What Went Wrong, supra note 97, at 2 (“The turbulent conditions in the
D&O insurance market persisted until mid-1986, when the rate of cost escalation and capacity
reduction declined.  While many corporations reported having difficulty in securing D&O insurance
coverage in 1986, only a small number failed to resolve the problem.”).  
101. Id. at 1-2; see also Kristen A. Linsley, Comment, Statutory Limitations on Directors’
Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 531 (1987) (noting that concern that qualified individuals would be
unwilling to serve as directors after Van Gorkom led to enactment of Delaware’s Section
102(b)(7)).
102. For an excellent discussion of the paucity of data on this issue, see Nowicki, supra note
64, at 478-79. 
103. See Silas, supra note 76, at 24.
104. Id.
105. The legislature could, for example, have increased the circumstances when directors
could rely on the CEO or market price in making informed decisions.  
106. For those companies putting in place a waiver of liability provision, actions seeking to
impose liability for breach of the duty of care could be summarily dismissed.  As the Delaware
believe that the problem would be short-lived,  with the market, in time,98
establishing a new equilibrium.   In fact, by 1987, the “crisis” was largely99
over.   100
The purported concern over corporate governance was never established.
While some anecdotal “evidence” indicated a growing number of resignations,101
the evidence was never marshaled to show that this resulted from problems in the
D&O insurance market or that adequate replacements were unavailable.102
Indeed, some of the evidence suggested that directors quit not because of a threat
of liability but because, in the aftermath of Van Gorkom, they had to work
harder.   Moreover, even if the pool had declined, companies had a ready103
mechanism for correcting the imbalance:  increasing directors’ fees.104
The adoption of waiver of liability amounted to an overbroad response to the
purported concerns about “uncertainty” in the application of the duty of care.  The
issues arising out of Van Gorkom could have been addressed in a narrower
fashion,  focusing, for example, on the basis for establishing an informed105
decision.   The provision, however, went beyond the purported problems created106
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Supreme Court noted in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 8 (Del. 2001),
unless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a trial on the
issue of entire fairness is unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will
exculpate director defendants from paying monetary damages that are exclusively
attributable to a violation of the duty of care.
Id. at 92; see Lubben & Darnell, supra note 67, at 591 (“We answer the first question by tracing
the waning of the duty of care—a rule that now requires little more of a director than a ritualistic
consideration of relevant data.  Today, after the director engages in this ritual, her decision will not
violate the duty. In short, the classic duty of care no longer exists in Delaware.”); see also Malpiede
v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096-97 (Del. 2001). 
107. Thus, for example, the “best interests of shareholders” is met by any rational purpose.
See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell:  Vote Buying, Manipulation of the Voting
Process, and the Race to the Bottom—The Last Word, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
preemption-of-delaware-law/portnoy-v-cryo-cell-vote-buying-manipulation-of-the-voting-p-3.html
(Feb. 14, 2008, 06:15 MST).
108. Which at least, in part, explains why so many commentators continue to ascribe the
reform to an attempt to overturn Van Gorkom.  See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment:  A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (2005) (“The
passage of 102(b)(7), in other words, was the legislature’s affirmation of the principle that the
judiciary would stay out of corporate governance, provided that the board did not behave disloyally
or, as the statute added, in bad faith.”).  
109. For at least some, the insurance crisis was the ostensible justification.  See generally
James J. Hanks, Jr., State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, 20 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 23 (Feb. 11, 1987).  Eventually, that could no longer be the explanation.  See
Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act:  Death Knells for
Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 271 (1993) (“Thus, in response to a temporary
problem, a liability insurance crunch that had affected most forms of liability insurance, and not
by the decision, eliminating liability even in circumstances where no uncertainty
existed.107
In other words, the Delaware legislature adopted waiver of liability
provisions to cure an insurance “crisis” that was short-lived, and likely structural,
in order to prevent adverse consequences which were unproven for boards of
directors.  Rather than fix the perceived concerns with Van Gorkom through a
narrowly tailored approach, Delaware’s legislature opted for an overbroad
solution that exonerated directors for breach of the duty of care in all
circumstances.  In short, it was a provision designed less to solve a real
governance problem and more to use the surrounding din as cover to reduce
director liability.   
Waiver of liability did not, therefore, restore the D&O insurance market.  It
did, however, restore Delaware’s pro-management position, something that had
taken a beating in the aftermath of Van Gorkom.  The “crisis” was little more than
a cover for a substantial, pro-management change in fiduciary obligations.108
Even as the insurance crisis dissipated, other states passed copycat legislation.
By corporate law reform standards, the speed with which other states fell in line
was nothing short of remarkable.   Within a few years of the new millennium,109
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D & O coverage alone, most American legislatures let themselves be goaded into adopting a
permanent change to bedrock common law.”) (footnote omitted).
110. Romano has reported that it took only fourteen years for forty-nine states to adopt some
form of liability limitation.  See Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 10, at 224.
111. See id. at 222-23. 
112. See id. 
113. In time, however, even Delaware stopped using the insurance crisis as the justification.
See William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review
Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 462-63 (2002) (“That statute, which was enacted in direct
response to Van Gorkom, permits certificates of incorporation to contain a provision that exculpates
directors from damages liability for breaches of the duty of care.  That statute thus restored most
of the liability protections afforded by a consistently applied gross negligence standard.”); see also
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995) (stating that “[t]he
statute was, in fact, a legislative response to [the Supreme Court of Delaware’s] liability holding
in Van Gorkom”).
114. Romano, The States as a Laboratory, supra note 10, at 224 (“Commentaries by
practitioners in several states refer to concern that firms would reincorporate if the state did not
adopt a limited liability statute similar to the Delaware provision.”).  Romano also contends that
the provisions were adopted because of “the perceived insurance crisis.”  Id. at 221.  States that
followed on the heels of Delaware could perhaps claim with a straight face that they acted in
response to the perceived crisis.  However, surely such a claim would be stretching credulity for
those acting several years later.  
115. Some have tried to argue that these provisions arose not out of self-interest, but
efficiency.  Roberta Romano notes that the provisions are “uniformly approved by shareholders”
and that the evidence “suggests that investors find the Delaware approach attractive.”  Id. at 224.
Having the provisions, she surmises, is “consistent” with “attracting higher quality outside
directors.”  Id. at 224-25.  Interestingly, she has apparently abandoned other rationale used in the
past to argue that these provisions are really beneficial.  See Romano, Corporate Governance,
supra note 63, at 1156 (“But the most popular reform, limited liability statutes, most likely will
prove to be beneficial for shareholders, by eliminating a class of lawsuits where insurance payouts
defray legal costs rather than compensate shareholders, and any deterrent effect is quite
problematic.”).   
116. See generally Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
all states had some version of waiver of liability.   A modest number of states110
chose an “opt-out” approach, eliminating monetary damages for breach of the
duty of care but allowing companies to reinstate damages through amendments
to the articles.   The vast majority of states, however, followed the Delaware111
model and relied on an “opt-in” approach.112
What could be the reasons?  Not the D&O insurance crisis; that was over.113
Not efficiency.  Instead, the statutes were designed to prevent companies from
moving to Delaware.   Whatever Delaware’s motivation, other states adopted114
comparable provisions not because of improved governance or efficiency,  but115
because the statutes benefited management and avoided re-incorporation, even
though some evidence suggested harm to shareholder values.116
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Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing how legal rules and
economic forces interact to facilitate corporate prosperity).  See also Honabach, supra note 81, at
312 (“Some also believe that both the enactment of section 102(b)(7) and the individual corporate
decisions to add an exculpatory provision to corporate charters resulted in a loss of shareholder
value.”).  As for attracting outside directors, there is simply no evidence that companies have
trouble attracting these types of directors, with or without waiver of liability provisions.  With
expanded indemnification, D&O insurance (no more crisis there), and director fees that can run
over a half a million dollars, it cannot be argued with a straight face that, absent waiver of liability,
a large public company would have trouble obtaining enough qualified outside directors. 
117. The repeal on size limits just before the turn of the nineteenth century may have arisen
from self interest but resulted in improved efficiencies.
118. See McChesney, supra note 73, at 648-49 (“As shareholders confronted the implications
of Van Gorkom, a second development was predictable. In the contractarian model, faced with a
decision that swept away existing contracts between shareholders and their management, competing
state legislatures would seek to restore the value-maximizing status quo ante.  Delaware’s
imposition of an inefficient law (one whose costs exceeded its benefits) created a profit opportunity
for politicians in other states to install rules guaranteeing that Van Gorkom could not happen in
their jurisdictions. That competition would force Delaware to mitigate the effects of the inefficient
rule it created.”).  
119. But see North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-
35-01 to -33 (Supp. 2007) (providing shareholders of public companies with the right to initiate
amendments to the articles of incorporation).  
120. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, Optimal Defaults, supra note 52, at 502 (“On most important
issues, corporate law requires companies wishing to opt out of a default arrangement to do so by
amending their charters.  Charter amendments, in turn, require approval by shareholders
representing a majority of the outstanding shares.  Shareholders can only act, however, on the basis
of proposals put forward by the board of directors.  Shareholders can never initiate charter
amendments, and the board thus enjoys a veto power over such amendments.”) (footnote omitted).
This is critical.  Even if management is eventually replaced, the new set of directors would
presumably want to retain the waiver of liability provision and would, therefore, be unlikely to
initiate an opt-out process.  It should be noted that Pennsylvania allows the provision to be included
in the bylaws which may permit shareholder initiation.  See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 513 (West
III.  THE CORPORATE RESPONSE
The conclusion that Delaware authorized waiver of liability provisions to
restore its pro-management reputation does not necessarily preclude a finding of
increased efficiency.   The Delaware model relied upon an opt-in approach,117
which theoretically allows owners and managers to bargain for the most efficient
arrangements.  
In practice, however, this has not been the case.   The “opt-in” approach118
used by the Delaware statute places exclusive authority in the hands of
management to institute a waiver of liability provision and to draft the appropriate
language.  Structured as amendments to the articles, only the board can initiate
the change.   The monopoly over initiation effectively bars shareholders from119
opting back into the default regime.   Management, therefore, can pick the most120
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1995).
121. Bebchuk & Hamdani, Optimal Defaults, supra note 52, at 503 (“For our purposes, what
is critical is only that there are impediments to reversing a default arrangement favored by
managers and that such an arrangement thus might not be reversed even if the arrangement is value
decreasing and the transaction costs of changing it are small. The problem is that default
arrangements favoring managers are likely to ‘stick.’”).  
122. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-
Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 585 (1996) (“Relatedly, one should not forget that
managers control the process by which such opting out terms are constructed, implemented, and
priced.  Managers or their agents typically bear responsibility for drafting the opt-out provisions,
and typically mangers establish the process through which the corporation or the corporate
constituencies ‘consent’ to the opt-out provisions.”).  
123. Others have noted the problem with suggesting that a corporation is a nexus of contracts
negotiated by the relevant parties.  See Brudney, supra note 14, at 1412 (“It stretches the concept
‘contract’ beyond recognition to use it to describe either the process of bargaining or the
arrangements between investors of publicly held corporations and either theoretical owners first
going public or corporate management.  Scattered stockholders cannot, and do not, negotiate with
owners who go public (or with management—either executives or directors) over hiring managers,
over the terms of their employment, or over their retention.”).  
124. See Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Definitive Proxy Solicitation Material (Form DEF 14A)
(Sept. 25, 1996) (“RESOLVED: The shareholders of Archer Daniels Midland Company urge the
Board of Directors to take such action as is necessary to provide for directors personal monetary
liability for acts or omissions that constitute a breach of a director’s fiduciary duty of care resulting
from gross negligence.”).  
125. See McChesney, supra note 73, at 649 (“Shareholders have overwhelmingly responded
to the opportunity by adopting the director-protecting charter amendments permitted by these new
statutes. So has been restored the status quo ante in corporate law:  virtually a zero-chance of
liability for directors in duty-of-care cases.”). 
126. Thus, for example, management with surly shareholders ready to oppose the provisions
might wait until reincorporation when shareholders will be denied a straight up or down vote on
the provision.
127. As commentators have noted:  “According to one treatise, in the year after enactment of
propitious moment to make a proposal, and, once in place, shareholders cannot
initiate repeal.   Finally, as the proponent, it is management that drafts the121
language in the waiver provisions.122
The adoption process, predictably, contains no element of bargaining or
private ordering.  Instead, it is a management-dominated process.  Given the123
benefits to management resulting from adoption, its control over the process, and
the inability of shareholders to initiate repeal, it is difficult to see the
opportunities for bargaining and private ordering.   Instead, one could124
reasonably predict that over time all companies would put these provisions in
place  and all provisions would waive liability to the fullest extent permitted by125
law.126
With these predictions in mind, let us turn to the empirical evidence.  Many
authors have already noted the popularity of waiver of liability provisions.    No127
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the section, 4,206 charter amendments or restated certificates of incorporation containing director
liability provisions were filed in Delaware.  The 13,697 new certificates of incorporation were filed
with these provisions.”  Lubben & Darnell, supra note 67, at 600 n.74 (citing 1-6 Delaware Corp.
L. & Prac. § 6.02 n.58 (2004)); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Von
Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (finding that “[c]harter provision enabling statutes like
Delaware’s section 102(b)(7), moreover, have been almost universally implemented by
corporations to which such laws apply”).  
128. But see Bradley & Schipani, supra note 116, at 62 (stating that of a sample of 593
Delaware firms “it appears that 94% (559/593) of Delaware firms amended their articles of
incorporation in accordance with section 102(b)(7)”).
129. Fortune 500:  Our Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr.
30, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/full_list/.  For a
list of the companies and the status of their waiver of liability provisions, see Appendix, supra note
12.
130. As of 2007, Freddie Mac was number 50 in the Fortune 100.  The articles of
incorporation for Freddie Mac are in the statute.  See generally Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Act, http://www.freddiemac.com/governance/pdf/charter.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2009).
131. N.Y. BUS CORP. LAW § 402 (McKinney 2003).
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7 (West 2003).
133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
134. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 513 (West 1995).  Pennsylvania allows the provision to be
included in the bylaws.  
135. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West 1994 & Supp. 2008) (requiring clear and
convincing proof “that the director’s action or failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken
with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for
the best interests of the corporation.”).  The provision does allow a corporation to opt out.  Id.
(“This division does not apply if, and only to the extent that, at the time of a director’s act or
omission that is the subject of complaint, the articles or the regulations of the corporation state by
specific reference to this division that the provisions of this division do not apply to the
corporation.”).  
136. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.320 (West 1994).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-02 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
138. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.10 (West 2004).
139. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 13 (West 2005).
one, however, has studied the phenomenon systematically.   128
We have chosen as the initial universe for examination the Fortune 100 in the
United States.   Of that group, ninety-nine are incorporated under state law.129
Freddie Mac, a federally incorporated entity, is the only exception.   Of the130
remainder, sixty-five are incorporated in Delaware, five in New York,  four in131
New Jersey,  Minnesota,  and Pennsylvania,  three in Ohio,  Washington,132 133 134 135 136
and North Carolina,  two in Illinois,  and Massachusetts,  and one in137 138 139
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140. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-870.1 (2006 & Supp. 2008)
141. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.2 (West 2002).
142. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204 (West 1990).
143. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).  Like Ohio, Wisconsin permits
a company to opt out of this provision.  
144. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West 1994 & Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.0828 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-870.1 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
146. We have assembled the statutory provisions governing waiver of liability from all fifty
states.  See Appendix, supra note 12.
147. Four of the companies in the top 100 are mutual companies:  Liberty Mutual Insurance
Group, State Farm, Mass Mutual, and New York Life.  At least one, however, has a waiver of
liability provision in the bylaws.  See Appendix, supra note 12.
148. Pepsico, Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, http://www.pepsico.com/
Investors/Corporate-Governance/Amended-and-Restated-Articles-of-Incorporation.aspx (last
visited Mar. 9, 2009).
149. See Pepsico, Our History, 1986, http://www.pepsico.com/Company/Our-History.aspx#
1986.page_3 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
150. Pepsico, By-Laws, Article III, § 3.7, http://www.pepsico.com/Investors/ Corporate-
Governance/By-Laws.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
151. These include Bank of America, Dow, Cisco, Exxon-Mobil, Boeing, Goldman Sachs,
Hewlett-Packard, Home Depot, JP Morgan Chase, Newscorp, Sears, Time Warner, and Disney.
152. Countrywide Financial Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4 (May 7, 2004).
Virginia,  Maryland,  California,  and Wisconsin.  140 141 142 143
Some of these states do not require charter provisions to “opt-in” to the
liability waiver.  In such states, the corporate code raises the level of culpability
necessary for the imposition of damages, with companies allowed to “opt-out.”
This is true in Ohio and Wisconsin.   Virginia imposes a cap but also allows144
elimination of liability in the articles.    The rest (other than Freddie Mac) mimic145
the Delaware model, with some variations in language.   146
Among the non-federally incorporated, non-mutual companies,  only one,147
Pepsi Co., did not have a waiver of liability provision.   Pepsi was incorporated148
in Delaware in 1919 and re-incorporated in North Carolina in 1986.   The149
bylaws do provide for indemnification rights “to the full extent permitted by
law.”  150
Our study of the articles of these companies shows that all waive liability to
the maximum extent permitted by law.  Several companies  have a bare bones151
version of the clause containing the following language:  “A director of the
Corporation shall have no personal liability to the Corporation or its stockholders
for monetary damages for breach of his fiduciary duty as a director to the full
extent permitted by the Delaware General Corporation Law as it may be amended
from time to time.”   The others generally repeat the language in the statute,152
providing that directors shall not be liable for monetary damages with some listed
exceptions.  Some specifically reference recklessness, while others prohibit
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153. For example, Comcast’s clause states:
No person who is or was a Director shall be personally liable, as such, for monetary
damages (other than under criminal statutes and under federal, state and local laws
imposing liability on directors for the payment of taxes) unless the person’s conduct
constitutes self-dealing, willful misconduct or recklessness. No amendment or repeal
of this Article ELEVENTH. . . .
Comcast, Restated Articles of Incorporation of Comcast Corporation, http://www.cmcsk.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=118591&p=irol-govArticles (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
154. In fact Dell’s articles of incorporation contain indemnity provisions in addition to waiving
liability:
[The] corporation shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, indemnify any and all
officers and directors of the corporation, and may, to the fullest extent permitted by law
or to such lesser extent as is determined in the discretion of the Board of Directors,
indemnify any and all other persons whom it shall have power to indemnify, from and
against all expenses, liabilities or other matters arising out of their status as such or their
acts, omissions or services rendered in such capacities.  The corporation shall have the
power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a
director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the
request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent  of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability
asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his
status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him
against such liability.
Dell Inc., supra note 61.
155. The data is in contrast with evidence from a study of the charter provisions of companies
listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange prior to the enactment of mandatory rules in 1936 conducted
by Professor Whincop.  See Michael J. Whincop, An Empirical Analysis of the Standardisation of
Corporate Charter Terms:  Opting Out of the Duty of Care, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 285, 285
(2003).  He examined 150 charters and found that “[m]ost companies opt for a limited indemnity
which does not extend to damages for negligence and adds little to the director’s ‘default’
indemnity rights.”  Id. at 291.  The evidence is markedly different from our results and shows that,
given the variance, it might be reflective of some bargaining: 
Liability releases are often qualified, but in standardised ways. The principal
qualifications refer to “wilful default” or “dishonesty,” 43.3% of the charters are
qualified by reference to wilful default; 39.3% refer to “dishonesty”; 6% refer to both
in the alternative.  Only three liability releases were unqualified and none of these
repeal.   With respect to liability for directors, none of the Fortune 100 purport153
to waive liability in some reduced fashion.    154
IV.  ANALYSIS
What explains this curious uniformity?  The data shows that one categorical
rule has been replaced with another.  While the old rule allowed for damages in
the case of a breach of the duty of care, the adoption of an “opt-in” approach to
monetary damages simply resulted in everyone opting in.  The results show none
of the diversity that private ordering predicted.   155
312 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:285
included the broadest form of release.
Id. at 292.  The study did find, however, that “a minority of companies opt for a more expansive
indemnity, wide enough to include liability for negligence, . . . [except] that the indemnity is not
available where the liability arises from the director’s ‘wilful default.’”  Id. at 291-92.  Unlike the
U.S. evidence, Professor Whincop finds that the Australian evidence shows that “terms contracting
around the standard of care do not appear to be systematically unfair to stockholders. On the
contrary, they are specifically directed to the areas where the imposition of liability seems least
efficient (such as liability for business judgments and the defaults of other agents).”  Id. at 307.
156. See data in Appendix, supra note 12 (showing uniformity).
157. 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007).
158. Id. at 798-99, 802-03.
159. Id. at 798-99.
160. Bebchuk & Hamdani, Optimal Defaults, supra note 52, at 499 (“At the IPO stage, the
provisions of the charter are chosen by the party, or parties, (the ‘founder’) that takes the company
public.”).  
161. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom, supra note 1, at 1401 (“Although an
amendment requires majority approval by the shareholders, voting shareholders do not have
sufficient incentive to become informed.  And although the amendment must be proposed by the
board, the directors’ decision might be shaped not only by the desire to maximize corporate value
but also by the different interests of officers and dominant shareholders.”).  
The data shows that companies do not opt-in in the waiver of liability
context.   This is because of the difficulties imposed on shareholders who might156
want to engage in some type of negotiations.  Thus, realities on the ground make
change difficult despite the presence of activist shareholders.  Many of these
difficulties are systemic.
First, only management has the authority to propose an amendment to the
articles of incorporation.  Directors can pick the most propitious time to propose
a matter to shareholders.  The authority goes much further, however, than the
power to propose.  To the extent management perceives any prospect of losing
a vote, it has a variety of tactics that it can deploy to affect the outcome.  One
example is Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc.,  where a special committee of the157
board sought approval of a merger.   When, shortly before the meeting, it158
became clear the proposal would fail, the committee authorized an
adjournment.   This occurred despite overwhelming opposition to adjournment159
of the meeting from shareholders.  
Second, waiver of liability provisions can be implemented without the benefit
of a direct shareholder vote.  The provisions may be in the articles when the
company goes public.   In other cases, they may be inserted into the articles160
when the company re-incorporates, leaving shareholders with approving the
entire transaction, not each individual provision in the articles.  Waiver of liability
provisions may also be approved in companies with controlling shareholders,
making the opinions of the minority shareholders irrelevant.  
Third, even when submitted for approval, shareholders confront the usual
bevy of collective action problems.   They lack information, often a161
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162. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1549, 1574-75 (1989) (“A diffuse group of public shareholders must evaluate this claim against the
possibility that the amendment is merely ‘wealth-neutral,’ because all or almost all of the gain
inures to the insiders, or ‘wealth-reducing,’ because it will transfer cash flow or control from public
shareholders to insiders.  In these circumstances, shareholder voting as a means of evaluating and
consenting to a proposed charter amendment is fraught with severe problems, in particular,
collective action problems in acquiring and disseminating information among shareholders, and
strategic behavior by insiders that amounts to economic coercion.  Thus insiders can exploit their
advantages to obtain approval even for wealth-reducing amendments.”) (footnote omitted).  
163. Most of the provisions were adopted back in the 1980s and early 1990s, at a time when
investor activism was not as developed. 
164. NIMBY or “Not In My Back Yard” occurs when directors oppose attempts to remove
waiver of liability provisions claiming that even if the idea is a good one, it is a reform that is not
needed in their company.
165. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 349 (1996).
Kahan and Klausner suggest that
corporate contract terms can frequently offer “increasing returns” as more firms employ
the same contract term.  Value arises from the common use of a contract term . . . . [A]s
the use of a term increases, it becomes significantly more attractive (at least up to a
critical point), and its attraction becomes self-perpetuating.
Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).  This results in standardization which is “a form of path dependence.”
Id.
166. Shareholder opposition surfaces mostly in the context of matters that affect economic
interests.  Shareholders will, therefore, be more likely to support changes that address issues of
entrenchment and mismanagement.  Shareholder proposals that most often pass over the opposition
of directors typically address anti-takeover devices or majority vote systems.
consequence of rational apathy.   To oppose management they would need to162
lobby other shareholders, which is both expensive and difficult due to the proxy
rules.   163
Fourth, there are a number of reasons why shareholders are less likely to
oppose waiver of liability provisions.  One is the NIMBY phenomenon.164
Another is path dependence.   Yet another is the “me-too” phenomenon, which165
occurs when one board has a waiver of liability provision to fall back on so every
other board clamors for the same.  With the provisions universally in place,
shareholders would have to accept the consequences of denying the waiver to
their management while all other large companies, including competitors, have
the waiver in place.  
Fifth, shareholders typically want to maintain positive relations with
management, preferring to “vote with their feet” when dissatisfied.  Thus, they
will not oppose management on every proposal, even if they have reservations.
In other words, opposition comes with costs attached.  Given the insignificance
of the duty of care under Delaware law, these costs likely outweigh the benefits
that could result from opposition.   166
Directors might be made nervous by a provision that differs from those of
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167. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 165, at 352-53 (noting “it is possible for a suboptimal
term to become standardized from the start and remain so.  [Or], a term may become standardized
and widely used even if it would be optimal for some firms to adopt an alternative term”).
168. Thus, we disagree with Professor Bainbridge, see supra note 59, that the nexus of
contracts theory compels an approach to corporate governance that requires a weakening of
shareholder authority.   
other companies. In such cases, our evidence might explain the persistence of
“suboptimal uniformity.”   The suboptimal rule waiving liability to the fullest167
extent allowed by the law has become uniform because learning or network
externalities are significant, especially because waiver of liability provisions are
drafted and proposed at the insistence of management.  Given the agency cost,
lawyers on the management payroll are unlikely to draft provisions that are
against the interests of management, even if such provisions are in the
management interests of shareholders.
CONCLUSION
The nexus-of-contracts approach is a worthy theoretical framework for the
examination of issues relating to corporate governance.  This is particularly true
in emphasizing the importance of private ordering in the regulatory process.  The
usefulness, however, breaks down when the approach is used to explain the
relationship between shareholders and management.  There is little evidence in
practice that the relationship between shareholders and managers can be
accurately characterized as a process of private ordering.  Instead, when the law
defers to private ordering, the result is that management is allowed to impose on
shareholders a categorical rule that embodies its self-interest.  In the context of
waiver of liability provisions, this approach has resulted in one categorical rule
being replaced by another—precisely the opposite of what contractarians desire.
Thus, it would seem that the contractarian approach does not offer an
adequate explanation for the situation with regard to waiver of liability
provisions. Based on our evidence, the managerial model might offer better
predictive power.  Management would always want the reduced liability.  Given
learning and network effects, over time, such provisions would become universal.
Management would also want protection to the fullest extent permitted.  This
would yield provisions consistent with the evidence that we have presented.
The evidence is consistent with a race to the bottom.  The waiver of liability
provisions were not designed to solve a corporate governance problem, but were
intended to benefit management.  Because management controls the re-
incorporation process, they could move the company to Delaware to take
advantage of reduced liability.  Other states quickly mimicked Delaware’s
approach, not because it promoted good governance or efficient behavior, but
because it prevented corporate flight to Delaware.  
To have anything approaching an effective system of bargaining, the
shareholder voting process must be meaningful.   Management must know that168
shareholders have the ability to veto or overturn an opt-in or opt-out decision.
Therefore, there must be substantial reform of the shareholder voting process.
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169. At least one state in narrow circumstances has given this authority to shareholders.  See
North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-35-01 to -33 (Supp.
2007).
These reforms need to do several things.  First, shareholders need authority
equal to that of management to initiate an opt-in or opt-out process or to change
a prior decision.  To do this, all opt-in or opt-out provisions either need to be in
the bylaws (with shareholders receiving explicit authority to initiate, change, or
repeal the bylaws) or, in the articles of incorporation with the authority to initiate
an amendment to the articles.169
Second, shareholders need to be given far broader authority to propose
changes to the arrangements that constitute the nexus of contracts in any
particular company.  There are substantial areas of governance that are off-limits
to shareholders.  These typically arise in the context of proposals that could affect
the management of the company.  The argument that shareholders should not be
allowed to micromanage the diurnal functioning of the company has been raised
as the bogey to limit shareholder empowerment in areas that, at best, involve de
minimis interference in the actual management of the company.  Shareholders
might condition support for a management inspired opt-in or opt-out proposal on
management support for additional shareholder authority, such as an advisory
vote on executive compensation.  
Third, steps need to be taken to solve some of the collective action problems
that impede the shareholder approval process.  These issues generally relate to
organization and cost.  Cost issues arise most clearly in the need to solicit proxies,
an expensive and time consuming process.  Liberal access to the company’s
proxy statement for shareholder proposals would be one way to reduce costs
associated with collective action.
